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Case No. 20100665-CA
IN THE-

; -•

UTAH COURT OP APPEALS

ANNA KING (f.k.a. Anna Wight),
Petitioner/Appellee
vs.
JOHN WIGHT,
Responden t/Appellent

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(c)
(West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by entering orders related to

custody including that the parties use the services of ACAFS, that right of first
refusal is limited to periods of three (3) hours or greater, and pick-up and dropoff times for the Respondent's summer parent time?
Standard of Revieiv. "In divorce proceedings . . . [appellate courts] give trial
courts broad discretion." Carslen v. Carsten, 2007 UT App. 174, fl 3 (Utah App.
2007) (quoting Davis v. Davis.. 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988)). The appellate court
will only overturn a trial court's final judgment if it constitutes an abuse of
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discretion. Id. Under the abuse of discretion standard, the appellate court "will
not reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." Shinkoskey v.
Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 1005,1009 (Utah App. 2001) (quoting Mast v. Overson, 971
R2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). Furthermore, in matters related to custody
of a minor child, the trial court's "proximity to the evidence places it in a more
advantaged position than an appellate court/7 Id. (quoting Tucker v. Tucker, 910
P.2d 1209,1214 (Utah 1996)). The trial court's discretion "must be guided at all
times by the best interests of tire child/' Id.
2.

-

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in entering orders on an

equitable distribution of the parties7 property and debts? '•..:••.
Standard of Review: Utah courts have held that "A trial court has

^

considerable discretion concerning property [division] in a divorce action, thus
its actions enjoy a presumption of validity/7 Elnian v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176,180
(Utah App. 2002) (quoting Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994)) (emphasis added). Appellate courts "disturb a trial court's property
division and valuation only when there is a misunderstanding or misapplication
of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly
preponderates against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as a
manifest a. clear abuse of discretion/' Id. Under the abuse of discretion standard,
the appellate court "will not reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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, reasonability." Shinkoskeyv. Shinkcskey, 19 P.3d 1005,1009 (Utah App. 2001)
(quoting Mast v. Overson, 971P.2d.928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)).
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it entered orders

consistent with the stipulation, of the Petitioner and Respondent?
Standard of Review. "In divorce proceedings . . . [appellate courts] give trial
courts broad discretion." Carsten v. Carsten, 2007 UT App. 174,1 3 (Utah App.
2007) (quoting Davis v, Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988)). The appellate court
will only overturn a trial court's final judgment if it constitutes an abuse of
discretion. Id.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
The statutes and rules pertinent to this appeal are Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
74, Utah Code § 30-3-2-9, Utah Code§ 30-3-3,. Utah Code § 30-3-5, and Utah Code
§ 30-3-33. The text of these provisions is included in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about August 9,2005, Petitioner filed her Complaint for Divorce
seeking a divorce from the Respondent. Since the filing of her Complaint for
Divorce, there have been multiple hearings in this matter resulting from the high
conflict nature of the parties' divorce and the inability of the parties to come to
agreements. On or about September 26, 2006, the parties stipulated to a
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.bifurcation of the Decree of Divorce . The parties were divorced on October 23,
2006. The parties have been actively litigated this matter since the entry of the
bifurcated Decree of Divorce including multiple Orders to Show Cause wherein
the court found Respondent significantly contributed to the high conflict nature
of the parties' divorce and that he had repeatedly failed to follow the orders of
•'the court:':"'';'''";-''.'
For example/on or about May 10,2007, this matter came before the court
on the first of many Orders to Show Cause initiated due to the Respondent's lack
of compliance with the court's orders.
On or about September 12, 2007, this matter, again, came before the court.
At said hearing, the court ordered that the Respondent was not allowed to pickup the minor children at their daycare, Adventure Time, due to his inappropriate
behavior at the minor children's daycare.
On or about December 18, 2007, this matter came before the court on
another Order to Show Cause. At said hearing, the court ordered that, due to
difficulties at exchanges, that all exchanges were to occur at a neutral
professional setting (ACAFS) and that no visitation exchanges were to occur at the children's daycare. The court also ordered that the Respondent at all times,
was not permitted within one (1) block of the Petitioner's home.
On or about March 10, 2008, this matter came before the court on another
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Order to Show Cause initiated by the Petitioner. Petitioner had paid die onehalf (1/2) of the custody evaluation fees that the Respondent was ordered to pay
to ensure a timely completion of the evaluation. Respondent stipulated that he .
owed the Petitioner for his share of the custody evaluation fees. Issues of the
Respondent's contempt for failure to timely cooperate with paying his portion of
the custody evaluation and attorney fees were reserved.
On or about June 26, 2008, this matter came before the court on another
Order to Show Cause. At saici hearing, the court entered judgment against the
Respondent for unpaid daycare and counseling fees incurred by the Petitioner.
The court further found that the Petitioner met her prima facie burden regarding .
contempt, but reserved sanctions for trial.
On or about October 30, 2008, this matter, again, came before the court for
yet another Order to Show Cause filed by the Petitioner and other motions before
the court. At hearing, the parties entered into a partial stipulation, including a
judgment against the Respondent, and new charges of contempt were reserved
for trial.
In addition to the above-mentioned hearings, this matter came before the
court on numerous other matters including, but not limited to: 1) objections to
the commissioner's recommendations; 2) motions to quash subpoenaed records;
3) multiple pretrial hearings; and, 4) multiple review hearings.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On or about April 15, 2009, this matter came before the trial court for the
first day of a multiple day trial During said trial, the parties entered into
stipulations on multiple pending issues. The court also received evidence. Said
trial concluded on July 16, 2009 after six (6) days of trial. The trial court ruled
from the bench on the remaining reserved issues.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In approximately August 2005, the parties separated and the Petitioner
filed her complaint for divorce. Petitioner moved from the marital home with
the minor children and has had primary physical custody of the minor children
since said separation. Respondent at all times has been the non-custodial parent
Rather than remain in the marital home, Respondent made the unwise
unilateral decision to rent the marital home to a third party and move to a home
closer to the Petitioner. From separation through the sale of the home,.
Respondent solely received the tax benefits of the mortgage payments.
Respondent failed to maintain mortgage payments and the Petitioner was
required to make payments to save the home and protect her credit. Despite
alleging at trial that he was unable to make the mortgage payments, Respondent
never moved the court for relief of the order that the Respondent pay the
mortgage payments.
The parties stipulated to sell the marital home. However, Respondent did
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not cooperate with the sale of the home. Two (2) separate realtors, Mr. Brandon.
Weekes and Ms. joy Lee, testified that the Respondent was not motivated to sell
the home. Mr. Weekes and Ms. Lee also testified that the home was. not properly
maintained while the Respondent hadpossession of the home.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court entered orders regarding the
equitable distribution of the parties' marital estate, including the marital home.
After the parties' separation, they experienced high conflict in making
even simpledecisions regarding the minor children. The trial court received
substantial testimony and evidence regarding the high conflict nature of the
parties' divorce. The trial court received testimony from Kaydeen Jensen,
Administrative Director of ACAFS, regarding the difficulties that the parties had
in communicating and coming to agreements. Ms. Jensen testified that the
parties' divorce was high conflict, providing multiple examples. The trial court
received testimony from the custody evaluator, Dr. Jay Jensen, who also testified,
that the parties7 divorce was highly conflictual. Further, Commissioner Patton
found in prior hearings before the court that the parties' divorce is high conflict.
Said hearings with Commissioner Patton were also part of the trialcourt's record
when it entered its findings. The trial court received testimony regarding a
protective order entered against the Respondent The trial court received
emotional testimony from the Petitioner about trie Respondent refusing to leave
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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her home and her feeling trapped by the Respondent in her home. The Petitioner
testified regarding the parties' divorce "high conflict" nature of the parties'
divorce.1 ::

• '

:

••

Due to the high conflict nature of the parties' divorce, the trial court
entered orders, including the use of ACAFS, limitation of the right of first refusal
to a reasonable three (3) hours, and other custody orders to help minimize the
conflict between the parties.

v

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I: This Court should uphold the trial court's factual findings in this
because: 1) Respondent did not marshal the evidence in support of the findings
he changes; and 2) even if he had marshaled the evidence supporting the Court's
findings, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's
findings.

•.•'•./,

Point II: This Court should uphold the trial court's rulings on custody
matters involving the minor child as the trial court did not abuse its broad
discretion in entering orders on custody related matters.
Point III: This Court should uphold the trial court's rulings on financial
1

It aupears that the onlv person that is challenging the label that the parties1'
divorce is "high conflict" is the Respondent. Respondent's continual assertions
that the parties' divorce is not high conflict demonstrates his lack of insight and
further demonstrates why the use of third'party services, such as ACAFS, is
necessary and why the trial court's order was reasonable given the tacts
presented.,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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matters as the Respondent has not overcome the presumption that said orders
are valid and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making said orders.
Point IV: This Court should uphold the trial court's orders that were
based on the stipulation of the parties as equity is not available to reinstate rights
voluntarily contracted away.
Point V: This Court should uphold the trial court's order awarding
attorney fees and costs to the Petitioner as the ruling is consistent with Utah law.
Point VI: This Court should award the Petitioner attorney fees as she was
awarded attorney fees and costs at the trial court leveh

;

.

ARGUMENT
L

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL
COURTS FACTUAL FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF ITS ORDER.
This Court should uphold the trial court's factual findings in this case for

two reasons. First, because Respondent did not marshal the evidence in support
of the findings'he changes. Second, because even if he had marshaled the
evidence supporting the Court's findings, there is ample evidence in the record
supporting the trial court's findings.
A.

This Court should reject Respondent's allegations of factual error
because he did not marshal the evidence in support of the trial
court's findings.

Under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a '"party
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challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports
the challenged finding:." In order to prooerly challenge factual findings such as
these, the challenging party is required to marshal "all of the evidence
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light
of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence/' Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Phis, 2007 UT 42/ ^ 17,164
P.3d 384 (quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Conim%776P2d
63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). Thus, to fully comply with the requirement, the
challenging party must "marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the 'findings against "an
attack." State v, Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, % 11,999 P.2d 1252 (internal quotations
and citation omitted). Perhaps the best explanation of the marshaling
requirement came from the Utah Court of Appeals itself when it stated:
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate.
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty
of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive
. and fastidious order, every crap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret
out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw' must be sufficient
to convince the appellate court that the court's findings resting upon the
evidence is clearly erroneous. West Valley City v. Majestic hw. Co., 818 P.2d
.: 1311,1315 (Utah Ct App. 1991) (emphasis in original).
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One key purpose of the marshaling requirement is to "remind [] litigants
and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial/' State
v. Moore, 802 R2d 732, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), Further, the marshaling
requirement is designed to ensure that the court is able to meaningfully review
the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the court below relied and overturn
only those factual determinations that lack the support of substantial evidence.
See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT at 1[ 17. As one commentator
noted, the marshaling requirement, which forces an appellant to "catalogue the
evidence supporting the trial court's decision/7 ensures that appellants do not
merely "try to persuade the appellate court that their theory of the case was
stronger than that which was advanced by the other side, or that their evidence
and witnesses were more compelling/' Rather it ensures that "appellate review
of a factual determination is strictly confined to an analysis of whether there was
sufficient evidence to support the particular factual conclusions that was actually
reached below." Ryan D. Tenney, The Utah Marshaling Requirement An
Overview, Utah B. J. 22 (August/September 2004).
Utah courts have imposed the marshaling requirements on pro se
appellants. See Thomas v. Department of Workforce Services, 2008 UT App 361 If 1
(unreported) Addressing whether a pro se litigant must satisfy the marshaling
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requirement, this Court opined that "while 'this court generally is lenient with
pro se litigants/ such parties must still comply with our rules/' Blosch v. Blosch,
2005 UT App 281 f 1 (unreported) (quoting Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, f 4);
see also Maisbitt v. Fink, 1999 UT App 129 If 3 (unreported).
Utah's appellate courts have historically accepted the lower court's
findings when the appellant fails to comply with the marshaling requirement.
See, e.g., State v. Earl, 2004 UT App 163, % 11, 92 P.3d 167. In Martinez v. MediaPaymaster Pins, 2007 UT 42, if 116-21,164 P.2d 384, the Utah Supreme Court held
that while automatic affirmation may not be required in all cases, it is still a
permissible sanction for a party who fails to properly marshal the evidence.
That sanction is appropriate here. This is not a case where an appellant
largely complied with the marshaling requirement but then inadvertently
omitted a few peripheral details. Rather, this is a case in which the party
challenging the court's factual findings completely failed to marshal any
evidence and instead merely provides the court with a restatement of his
unsuccessful arguments from oral argument.
Respondent attempts to address the issue of marshaling the evidence and
improperly alleges that he is not required to marshal the evidence in this matter
as the findings are legally inadequate.
However, the trial court's findings and order provides the findings of fact
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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necessary to support it conclusions. For example, in making its order on the use
of A CAPS, the trial court made the following findings of fact:
"The use of ACAFS for pick-up and drop-off of the children has been
beneficial to the parties/'
"ACAFS has been successful in helping the parties communicate and
limiting any potential emotional issues occurring between the parties at
pick-up and drop-off/7
"The emotional issues between the parties are ample and compelling to
justify the need for ACAFS." See Third Amended Findings and Order,
Paragraph 6, Addendum.
Additionally, prior to entering its orders on the marital home, the trial court
entered the following findings of fact:
"Respondent made an ill-advised decision when he left the home and
decided to rent the marital home to third parties, as well as obtain another
' residence for himself." Id. at Paragraph 25;
- "Normally the expenses of the parties double after separation. In this case,
the Respondent made a decision to nearly triple the expenses of the
• parties." Id. at Paragraph 26;
"Responded could have reduced expenses by staying iii the marital
home." Id. at paragraph 27;
• "Respondent could also reduced expenses by immediately placing the
marital home for sale." Id. at Paragraph 28.
The above-mentioned examples are just a few of the instances of the trial court
entering findings of fact in its order. See also generally, Third Amended Findings
of Fact and Conclusions Law, Addendum. Contrary to the Respondent's
assertion, the court did provide findings of fact in its order and reversal is not
appropriate on the basis of not providing findings of fact. Id.
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B.

Even if this Court addresses Respondent's sufficiency challenge on
its merits, this Court should still hold that there was sufficient
evidence to support the trial court's findings.

Even if the Court determines that Respondent's brief meets the lower level
of marshaling required for prose litigants, the Court should still affirm the trial
court's findings of fact because sufficient evidence was not presented to
overcome a challenge of clear error. A finding of fact is only "clearly erroneous"
when it is "so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence." State ex rel. E. R., 2001 Ut App 66,1 5,21 P.3d 680.
Respondent challenges to the findings of fact in this matter can generally
be grouped into three (3) separate categories: 1) challenges to the trial court's
orders regarding the property disbursement and child related expenses of the
parties; 2) challenges to the trial court's parent time orders including the use of
ACAFS and right of first refusal; and, 3) challenges to orders that were the result
of the stipulation of the parties.
The trial court received substantial evidence at trial, and prior to trial,
regarding the parties' financial circumstances and issues surrounding the
disbursement of property, including the marital home. For example, the trial
court received testimony from two (2) separate realtors that were involved in the
sale of the marital home. The realtors testified as to the Respondent not
returning calls and the poor condition of the home when they viewed it. The

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

trial court received further financial information from both parties. The abovementioned testimony and evidence is just some of the evidence that that the trial
cou rt has on the record regarding the financial issues in this matter. As the
record is patently replete with such evidence regarding financial issues, the
findings are not so lacking in evidentiary detail as to be clearly erroneous.
The trial court also received substantial evidence regarding the high
conflict nature of the parties' divorce including, as discussed previously herein:
1) testimony from Kaydeen Jensen, Administrative Director of ACAFS; 2)
testimony from the custody evaluator; 3) previous findings from Commissioner
Patton of the high conflict nature of the parties' divorce; and, 4) testimony from
the Petitioner. Additionally, the trial court received testimony from Adventure
Time Daycare of the substantial difficulties that the Respondent caused at the
facility that led to him being excluded from coming to the daycare facility.
While the Respondent challenges the findings of the court that the parties'
divorce is high conflict/he has not demonstrated that it is clearly erroneous to
label the parties divorce as "high conflict." The high conflict nature of the
divorce was the reason the trial court entered its custody orders including, b u t
not limited to, the use of ACAFS, the right of first refusal, and the pick-up and
drop-off times. Based on the substantial evidence received at trial, it is not
clearly erroneous to label the parties' divorce as "high conflict."
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Finally, Respondent even challenges orders that were based on the
stipulations of the parties. While there is substantial evidence to support an
order appointing a special master or an order limiting the parties from making
derogatory comments about the other party, it is not necessary to support said
orders with findings. Said orders are the result of the stipulation of the parties.
Contrary to the Respondent's assertion, there is sufficient evidence on the
Record supporting the trial court's findings overcome a challenge of "clear
error."
II.

:

,• / /••:.;,,;,•;,.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE IS BROAD DISCRETION IN
MAKING CUSTODY ORDERS IN THIS MATTER.

"In divorce proceedings ..... [appellate courts] give trial courts broad
discretion." Carsten v. Carsten, 2007 UT App. 174, f 3 (Utah App. 2007) (quoting
Davis v.Davis, 749 P.2d 647,648 (Utah 1988)). The appellate court will only
overturn a trial court's final judgment if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id.
Under the abuse of discretion standard, the appellate court "will not reverse
unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability/' Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, '
19 P.3d 1005,1009 (Utah App. 2001) (quoting Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931
(Utah Ct. App. 1998)). Furthermore, in matters related to custody of a minor
child, the trial court's "proximity to the evidence places it in a more advantaged
position than an appellate court/' Id. (quoting Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209,
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1214 (Utah 1996)). The trial court's discretion "must he guided at all times by
the best interests of the child/' Id.
The trial court's decisions regarding the use of ACAFS, the time limit on
the right of first refusal, and pick-up and drop-off times in the summer are all
orders related to the custody of the minor children and, thus, the trial court is in
a more advantaged position than the appellate court. Furthermore, all decisions
on custody related matters must be guided by the best interests of the minor
children.
A.

\
The Trial Court Appropriately Ordered that the Use of ACAFS was
Reasonable and Necessary due to the High Conflict Nature of the
Parties Divorce.

At trial in this matter, the court entered findings that "the parties have
experienced high conflict that has seriously deterred their ability to
communicate."' See Third Amended Findings of Fact and Order, P a r a g r a p h s ,
Addendum. The court further found that "The use of ACAFS for pick-up and
drop-off of the children has been beneficial to the parties. ACAFS has been
successful in helping the parties communicate and limiting any potential
emotional issues occurring between the parties at pick-up and drop-off. The
emotional issues between the parties are ample and compelling and justify the
need for ACAFS." See Third Amended Findings of Fact and Order, Paragraph 6,
Addendum.
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There is substantial evidence in the record, to support the trial court's
finding that the parties' divorce is '''high conflict" and the above-mentioned
findings of fact. For example, as discussed previously herein: 1) Kaydeen Jensen
testified as to the need for ACAFS; 2) the custody evaluator, Dr. Jensen, testified
that the parties' divorce was high conflict; 3) the Petitioner testified that the
parties' divorce was high conflict; 4) the daycare provider for the minor children
testified as to the high conflict nature of the divorce and the difficulties caused by
the Respondent; and, 5) the trial court had a long history of prior hearings both
before the trial court judge and the domestic commissioner.
Based on the high conflict nature of the parties' divorce, it was within the
limits of reasonability for the trial court to order that the parties continue the use
of ACAFS.2

;

Respondent argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it
stopped his testimony regarding ACAFS. Prior to stopping the Respondent's
testimony, the court received evidence from the Respondent that he felt that
ACAFS was financially onerous to the parties. The court received testimony
from the Respondent that exchanges were difficult due to the time it takes to use
ACAFS including additional drive time. The court received testimony about
2

ACAFS provides services for the parties including calendaring, pick-ups and
drop-offs, and other important services that limit the potential conflicts between
the parties.
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curbside exchanges and why the Respondent felt that the parties should use
curbside exchanges. The above-mentioned arguments are the same arguments
that the Respondent made in. his brief, wherein he erroneously asserts that the
court abused discretion in ordering the parties continue to use ACAFS.
Respondent has not established that the court did not consider his testimony.
Furthermore, Respondent has not established that his testimony that it is outside
the limits of reason to find that the parties should continue to use ACAFS.
Even if this court accepts the Respondent's argument that ACAFS is a
financial burden 3 , he must show that the order is not in the best interest of the
minor children. As discussed previously herein, in matters related to custody of
a minor child, the trial court's "proximity to the evidence places it in a more
advantaged position than an appellate court." Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d
1005,1009 (Utah App. 2001) (quoting Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209,1214 (Utah
1996)). The trial court's discretion "must be guided at all times by the best
interests of the child." hi. Respondent argues that the use of ACAFS creates an
unreasonable financial burden. Respondent does not argue that the parties use
of ACAFS is not in the best interests of the children. Respondent must show that

3

The trial court received testimony at trial of the parties' financial circumstances
including the stipulation of the parties' related to many of the financial
circumstances of the parties. Respondent has not demonstrated that this
testimony was not considered.
.
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the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the use of ACAFS is in the
children's best interest. Respondent has made no effort to argue that the use of
ACAFS is not in the children's best interests. Respondent does not weigh the
evidence presented by the Petitioner and demonstrate how that the order is not
reasonable considering all the evidence presented. In fact, due to the high
conflict nature.of the parties' divorce, it is reasonable for the trial court to find
that the use of ACAFS is in the best interest of the minor child.
B.

The Trial Court's Restriction of Right of First Refusal is not an Abuse
of the Trial Court's Discretion.

At trial in this matter, the parties stipulated that each party is granted the
right of first refusal to provide daycare for the minor child. However, the parties
were unable to agree to the amount of time the children were to be left with
another individual prior to a parent having said right and the issue was reserved
for trial. At trial, Respondent indicated that it was reasonable for him to exercise
his right of first refusal for time periods as little as one (1) hour.
Respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering
that the right of first refusal only applies for periods of three (3) hours or greater.
In support of his argument, the Respondent cites Utah Code § 30-3-33(15) which
provides that "Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than
surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing
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the noncustodial parent it willing and able to transport the children, to provide
the child care/ 7 Utah Code § 30-3-33(15). Respondent alleges that "the trial court
completely disregards the principles in the statute governing the issue/' See Brief
of Appellant, Page 41.
Respondent is arguing that he should be allowed to have surrogate care
for any time period with his minor children. If the Petitioner left the minor
children with her husband for a period of twenty (20) minutes to run errands at
the store/she would be required to contact the Respondent and give him the
option to provide surrogate care. In fact, Petitioner would be required to provide
notice to the Respondent any time that she was leaving the parties 7 children with
another individual.

/ •

In this matter, the-trial court is in the best position to make orders
regarding the period of surrogate care that is in the best interests of the children.
Due to the high conflict in this case, it is not in the best interests of the child to
transition the children for periods of twenty (20) minutes. It is not outside the
limits of reasonability to limit the right of first refusal to three (3) hours.
Additionally, even if this court accept the Respondent's argument in full
that the trial court disregarded the principles of Utah Code § 30-3-33, it is within
the trial court's discretion to disregard said principles. Utah Code § 30-3-33 are
"advisory guidelines/ 7 Utah Code § 30-3-33 indicates that "the following
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advisory guidelines are suggested, to govern all parent-time arrangements
between parents/' Utah Code § 30-3-33 (emphasis added).
. The trial court received substantial evidence at trial that would support the
order that right of first refusal should not be more than three (3) hours. For
example, the trial court received testimony of the high amount of shuffling that
periods of one (1) hour would cause for the children. If the court were to accept
the Respondent' arguments, the parties would be required to communicate
whenever they run even simple errands to the store and leave the children with •
another party. Due to the parties' high conflict divorce / it is within the limits of
reasonability to limit the exchanges of the minor children. Respondent has not
demonstrated that, even in light of the evidence in the record, that surrogate care
periods of less than three (3) hours are outside the limits of reasonability.
The trial court is in the best position to determine if the advisory
guidelines are in the best interest of the child. Even if the trial court completely
ignored the advisory guidelines, it is well within its discretion to do so and not
outside the limits of reasonability.
C.

The Trial Court's did not Abuse its Discretion in Entering Orders for
Pick-up and Drop-off Times for Respondent's Summer Parent Time.

The parties entered into a stipulation regarding custody and parent time,
but reserved the issue of when pick-up and drop-off would occur during
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summer parent time. At trial, the trial court entered custody orders for pick-up
and drop-off for the Respondent's parent time in the summer. As the abovementioned orders relate to custody and parent time, the trial court's decision is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Shinkoskeyv. Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 1005,1009
(Utah App. 2001).
It is within the limits of reasonability for the trial court to order 6:00 p.m.
for pick-up and 9:00 a.m. for drop-off for the Respondent's summer parent time.
Additionally, the trial court is in the best position to make determinations
regarding custody and parent time. As discussed previously herein, there is
substantial evidence in the record regarding the difficulties that the parties have
experienced in this matter. In setting the pick-up and drop-off times for the
summer, the trial court has provided consistent times that will not leave the
children subject to the disputes of their parents on pick-up and drop-off times.
As such, this Court should deny the Respondent's request to change the pick-up
and drop-off times for his parent time.
III.

RESPONDENT HAS NOT OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S PROPERTY ORDERS ARE VALID.

Utah courts have held that the "trial court has considerable discretion
concerning property [division] in a divorce action, thus its actions enjoy a
presumption of validity/' Elm.au v. Eliium, 45 P.3d 176,180 (Utah App. 2002)
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(quoting Schauniberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah Ct. App, 1994))
(emphasis added). Appellate courts "disturb.a trial court's property division and
valuation only when there is a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderates
against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as a manifest a clear
abuse of discretion/7 Id. Under the abuse of discretion standard, the appellate
court "will not reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability."
SMnkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 1005,1009 (Utah App. 2001) (quoting Mast v.
Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)).

-

Respondent alleges that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not
give him credit for mortgage payments that he made on the home and when it
gave the Petitioner $3,500.00 carpet allowance for depreciation of value in the
maritalhome.
A.

The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion by not providing the
Respondent with Credits for Payment of the Mortgage Payment on
the Marital Home.

Respondent alleged that the trial court abused its discretion: 1) "because it
considered only the economic situation of the parties at separation;" 2) the trial
court "us[ed] the rationale that the last person holding the bag is responsible/
This is not an acceptable standard by which to make equitable marital
distributions/' and, 3) "that the trial court's decision lacks completeness in
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findings 01 fact and conclusions of law/' See Brief of Appellant Pages 49-50.
Respondent has cited no case law or any sta tute to support any of his
arguments that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not give him a
credit for the mortgage payments made. Respondent is wholly unable to
overcome the presumption of validity of the property distribution.
In this matter, the trial court disallowed the Respondent's request for
reimbursement for mortgage payments because of his "ill advised decision when
he left the home and decided to rent the marital home to third parties, as well as
obtain another residence for himself." See Third Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, Paragraph 25. The trial court found that "Respondent made
a decision to nearly triple the expenses of the parties." Id. at Paragraph 26. The
trial court found that "Respondent could also reduced expenses by immediately
placing the marital home for sale." Id. at Paragraph 27. In light of the evidence
produced at trial, it does not"exceed the limits of reasonability" for the trial
court to deny the Respondent's request for reimbursement for mortgage
payments.
Additionally, the court heard evidence at trial that the Respondent had
previously stipulated to pay the mortgage payments. The court heard evidence
at trial that the Respondent solely received the tax benefits of the mortgage
payments. The court heard evidence at trial tha t the Respondent never moved
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the court for relief of the order that the Respondent pay the mortgage payments.
In support of the above-mentioned findings of fact, the record reflects evidence
from two (2) separate realtors that the Respondent did not seem motivated to sell
the home. The record also reflects testimony that the home was not properly
maintained while the Respondent had possession of the home. In light of all the
evidence submitted at trial, it is certainly within the limits of reasonability to
disallow the Respondent's request for reimbursement for payment of the
mortgage.
Respondent alleges that the trial court"abused its discretion because it
considered only the economic situation of the parties at separation." Respondent
cites no case law that requires the trial court to consider the economic situation of
the parties at the time of trial. The trial court heard evidence regarding the
parties' financial circumstances, at the time of trial, and evaluated said evidence
in making its ruling.
Further, even if the trial court did not consider the parties' economic
situation at the time of trial there is no requirement that the trial court consider
this information. Furthermore, it does not exceed the limits of reasonability to
not consider the financial circumstances of the parties at the time of trial.
Respondent makes several arguments regarding "asset responsibility7' and
that the trial court applied an unacceptable standard by which to make marital
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distributions. However, none of these arguments are based in any precedent
bearing Utah law. In actuality, they are not based in any law; only Respondent's
prejudiced opinion of how the court should have divided property. Respondent
has provided no law supporting his claims of said "unacceptable standard/'
Finally, Respondent alleges that the trial court's decision lacks
completeness in findings of fact and conclusions of law. Respondent does not
provide any argument how the trial court's decision lacks completeness. As
discussed previously herein, the trial court made several paragraphs of findings
of facts in support of its decision. Id. at Paragraphs 23 - 28. Furthermore, as
discussed previously herein, Respondent failed to marshal all the evidence
submitted at trial in support of the trial court's findings and his argument of
inadequate findings of fact should be denied.
B.

The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Providing the
Petitioner with an Offset for the Carpet Allowance for the Parties'
Marital Home.

Respondent misguidedly challenges the Court's order regarding the
$3,500.00 carpet allowance for twro (2) reasons: 1) that the form of the Court order
was not proper and that the trial court did not award her $3,500,00 for
depreciation of the asset; and, 2) that the trial court abused its discretion in
awarding an allowance for the depreciation of the marital home.
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1. :,:

1 he Trial Court has already Ruled thai the Intent of its Riding was to
Grant Petitioner an Offset of'$3,500.00 for Hie Depreciation of the Asset.

In his brief, Respondent argues that "Husband objected to the form of the
order when this language [regarding the dissipation of the marital asset for the
carpet] was originally submitted, but the objection was over-ruled/7 See Brief of
Appellant, Page 50 (emphasis added).
It is undisputed that the trial court addressed the Respondent's objection
to the form of the trial court's order. It is undisputed that the trial court
.addressed his objection to the form of the order. It is undisputed that the trial
court did not disturb the form of the order prepared. In response to the
Respondent's objection to the language regarding the carpet allowance, the trial
court"overrule[d] the objection as the finding is consistent with the Court's
findings and Petitioner is not limited to the specific words used in the bench
ruling/' See Ruling Re: Objections to the Findings of Fact and Order, Addendum.
The trial court has already ruled that the intent of its order was to give the
Petitioner a $3,500.00 offset for the carpet allowance. As such, this court should
deny the Respondent's objection to the form of the order as the trial court already
ruled that it intended to provide the Petitioner with a $3,500.00 offset for the
carpet allowance.
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2.

The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Providing the Petitioner a
$3,500.00 Offset for the Dissipation of the Marital Asset.

In making his arguments that the court abused its discretion, Respondent
does not articulate any legal standard or cite any case law in support of his
arguments- Furthermore, Respondent does not articulate how the trial court's
decision "exceeds the limits of reasonability." Instead, Respondent argues that
the court did not consider the current housing crisis in making its decision. Even
if the court were to accept the Respondent's arguments in full, the award still is
within the limits of reasonability and the Respondent has not overcome the
presumption that the trial court's decision was valid.
A.

The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Ordering that the
Respondent is Responsible for Daycare and/or Kindergarten Costs
for his Minor Children.

Utah Code § 30-3-5 grants trial courts broad equitable powers in entering
orders on property, debts, and other financial matters in a divorce action. Utah
Code § 30-3-5. A trial court "may include in [an order] equitable orders relating
to the children, property, debts, or obligations, and parties." Utah Code § 30-3-5.
As discussed previously herein, orders regarding financial matters "will not
reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." Shinkoskey v.
Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 1005,1009 (Utah App. 2001) (quoting Mast v. Qverson, 971
P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)).
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The trial court granted the Petitioner $5,000.00 for a portion of the daycare
costs for the minor children. In making its order, the trial court entered findings
that 'The use of Adventure Time's services in this matter was helpful to reduce
conflict between the parties and was a usual, beneficial, and appropriate form of
daycare." See Third Amended Findings of Fact and Order on Hearing,
Paragraph 10, Addendum. The trial court further found that "Respondent did
not offer a practical alternative to Adventure Time. His proposed alternatives
involved too much shuffling of the children/' Id. at Paragraph 11. Finally, the
trial court found that "Respondent seemingly waived his complaint regarding
Adventure Time by continuing to allow the children to attend Adventure Time/7
In his brief, Respondent challenges the adequacy of the trial court's
findings of fact on the issues surrounding daycare. In making said challenge to
the findings of fact, Respondent does not marshal the evidence in support of the
trial court's ruling. Respondent alleges that "the trial court does not include any
explanation as to why daycare represents less 'shuffling of the children.'" See
Brief of Appellant, Page 32. The trial court heard evidence and testimony as to
the alternatives offered by the Respondent and found that his options were not
reasonable. If Respondent wants to challenge the adequacy of this finding, it is
his burden to marshal all the evidence at trial in support of the trial court's
finding. Respondent fails to do so. Respondent makes other challenges to the
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adequacy of the findings, but, again, fails to marshal the evidence in making his
challenge to the findings.
Rather than provide legal analysis as to why the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding the Petitioner $5,000.00 for daycare fees, Respondent
opines on why the divorce is not "high conflict/7 his concerns over the fees in
"high conflict" divorce cases, and his desire to provide surrogate care. As
discussed previously herein, there is ample evidence in the record to support a
finding that the parties7 divorce is high conflict. Furthermore, as discussed
previously herein there is evidence to support a finding that Respondent's
alternatives for providing surrogate care were not reasonable.
Respondent's only attempted legal support provided is reference to the
advisory guidelines of Utah Code § 30-3-33(15) which provides that/'Parental
care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care." Utah
Code § 30-3-33(15). Said guidelines are advisory in nature and the court is not
required to adopt said guidelines. Additionally, said guidelines do not indicate
that if a parent is denied his right to surrogate care that the parties are not
responsible for the costs of daycare. As such, Respondent has provided no legal
support for his position that the trial court abused its discretion in awarded
Petitioner daycare fees.
Additionally, even if the court accepts the Respondent's argument that the
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adequacy of the findings, but, again, fails to marshal the evidence in making his
challenge to the findings.
Rather than provide legal analysis as to why the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding the Petitioner $5,000.00 for daycare fees, Respondent
opines on why the divorce is not "high conflict/7 his concerns over the fees in
"high conflict" divorce cases, and his desire to provide surrogate care. As
discussed previously herein, there is ample evidence in the record to support a
finding that the parties' divorce is high conflict. Furthermore, as discussed
previously herein there is evidence to support a finding that Respondent's
alternatives for providing surrogate care were not reasonable.
Respondent's only attempted legal support provided is reference to the
advisory guidelines of Utah Code § 30-3-33(15) which provides that "Parental
care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care." Utah
Code § 30-3-33(15). Said guidelines are advisory in nature and the court is not
required to adopt said guidelines. Additionally, said guidelines do not indicate
that if a parent is denied his right to surrogate care that the parties are not
responsible for the costs of daycare. As such, Respondent has provided no legal
support for his position that the trial court abused its discretion in awarded
Petitioner daycare fees.
Additionally, even if the court accepts the Respondent's argument that the
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A.

The Parties Stipulated to the Appointment of a Special Master and
Equity is not Available to Relieve the Respondent of said
Stipulation.

On the final day of the hearing in this matter, the parties entered into an
agreement, on the record, to appoint a special master for the purposes of
resolving parent time disputes. The parties stipulated as follows:
THE COURT: Am I hearing a stipulation to employ Mr. Jackman as a
Special Master
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes.
MR. WILKINSON: For purposes of resolving any disputes between the
parties on parent time issues.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes, your honor.
THE COURT: IT1 order that. (TT6 at 799-800).
After trial in this matter, Petitioner's counsel prepared several drafts of a Special
Master Order with the Respondent's counsel objecting to the form of many of
those orders. However, the parties were able to agree on the form of a Special
Master Order. Said Special Master order was approved as to form by the
Respondent's counsel. See Special Master Order, Addendum.
Respondent is now alleging that the "he has not stipulated to a special
master to anything more than [choosing a therapist for the children], unless it is
in consideration for using such services in lieu of ACAFS exchanges, and then
only according to Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/'' See Brief of
Appellant, Page 28, Footnote 11.
Contrary to the Respondent's assertion, the trial record clearly
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demonstrates that he entered into a stipulation for the appointment of Mr.
Jackmari as Special Master for resolving parent time disputes between the
parties. Additionally, contrary to the Respondent's assertion, his counsel
approved as to form of the Special Master Order.
In this matter, Respondent is now dissatisfied with the appointment of the
Special Master and the form of the Special Master Order and is attempting to use
his appeal as a means to relieve himself of burdens of the bargain he entered into
while still retaining its benefits. Hill v. Hill 841 P.2d 722 (Utah App. 1992).
Allowing the Respondent to be relieved of the stipulation to appoint a Special
Master would be highly inequitable to the Petitioner. Id.
B.

Respondent's Stipulation to a Mutual Restraining Order is not a
Deprival of his First Amended Free Speech Rights.

,

Petitioner and Respondent stipulated to the following:
"The parties shall be mutually restrained from making derogatory remarks
regarding the other party to, or in the presence of, the minor children. The
parties shall use their best efforts to prevent third parties from speaking in
a disparaging manner about either parent in the presence of the child. The
parties shall also be mutually restrained from making derogatory remarks
about the other party to his or her fellow employees, employers and/ or
ecclesiastical leaders/' See Third Amended Findings and Order on
Hearing, Paragraph 50.
Respondent now challenges the parties' stipulated order alleging that the
order violates his First Amendment rigjits.
The order of the court was the result
i
—'

of the stipulation of the parties. In this matter, Respondent has clearly come to
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regret the bargain that he entered into. However, it would be inequitable to
allow the Respondent to retain the benefits of the bargain and relieved of the
obligations he assumed in his bargain. Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722 (Utah App. 1992).
Additionally, the First Amended provides that"Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech/' In this matter, congress has not made
a law abridging the Respondent's speech. Respondent has entered into a
stipulation that abridged his right to make derogatory comments regarding the
Petitioner. As such, Respondent's argument that his stipulation has impacted
his First Amendment rights must fail.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT'S APPROPRIATELY AWARDED ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS TO THE PETITIONER.
In his brief, Respondent argues that "the trial court failed to adequately

present its findings of fact and conclusions of law on this matter." See Brief of
Appellant, Page 54. Respondent also argues that the "trial court erred in not
considering the financial status and the likely financial results of the parties in
awarding any attorney fees from the trial." Id.
The trial court entered findings of fact as follows:
"Respondent's actions and failures clearly resulted in Petitioner incurring
substantial attorney fees. Respondent's actions and failures included the
... following:
A.
B.

Repeatedly failing to timely pay his child support obligation.
Repeatedly failing to timely pay his one-half (1/2) of the insurance
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C.
D.
E.
F.

premiums for the minor children.
Repeatedly failing to timely pay his one-half (1/2) of the uncovered
• medical expenses for the minor children.
Repeatedly failing to timely pay the mortgage payments he was
ordered to. maintain.
Failing to timely pay for the custody evaluation fees.
Interfering with the children's daycare at Adventure Time. See
Third Amended Findings and Order on Hearing, Paragraph 34.

The trial court articulated six (6) independent reasons for awarding the
Petitioner's attorney fees and costs. At trial, the trial court received testimony
and evidence regarding the Respondent's failures. In challenging the trial court's
findings, Respondent has not marshaled the testimony and evidence in support
of the trial court's findings. The testimony at trial supports the findings made by
the trial court.
Utah Code § 30-3-3(1) provides that "in any action to establish an order of
custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a
domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other
party to prosecute or defend the action." Utah Code § 30-3-3(1) provides for
attorney fees to "enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action." Utah
Code § 30-3-3(1), As such, Utah Code § 30-3-3(1) does require the Court to make
a finding that there is a need for the attorney fees and an ability to.pay attorney
fees. In contrast Utah Code § 30-3-3(2) provides that:
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"Ill any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award,
costs and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially
prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may
award no fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is
impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees/'
Utah Code'§ 30-3-3(2).
Utah courts have distinguished the two (2) sections of Utah Code § 30-3-3
allowing for an award of attorney fees. Utah courts have indicated that "Utah
Code Section § 30-3-3 creates two classes of attorney-fees — those incurred in
establishing court orders and those incurred in enforcing court orders/' See Connell
v. Connell, 2010 UT App. 139, Tf 28 (Ut. App. 2010).
Utah Code § 30-3-3(2) does not require the Court to make a finding that the
party has the ability to pay or that the fees are needed. Instead/Utah Code § 303-3(2) provides that the Court has the discretion to consider ability to pay. Utah
courts further clarified that "Fees awarded under subsection (1) must be based
on the usual factors of need, ability to pay, and reasonableness. See Stoneliockerv.
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App. 11, ^f 49. By contrast, in awarding fees under
subsection (2), the court 'may disregard the financial need of the moving party/
Finlaysonv. Firilayson, 874 R2d 843, 850 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)" Connell v. Cornel,
2010 UT App. 139, ^f 28 (Utah App. 2010) (emphasis added). The court further
clarified that "The subsections have different requirements because they have
different purposes." hi. at fj 29. Utah courts have held that "In an action to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

enforce the provision of a divorce decree, an award of attorney fees is based
solely upon the trial court's discretion, regardless of the financial need of the
moving party/' M. at«] 28 (quoting Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 R2d 1027,1030 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992)) (emphasis added).
Utah Code § 30-3-3(2) "serve[s] no equalizing function but allow[s] the
moving party to collect fees unnecessarily incurred due to the other party's
recalcitrance/' Id. at ^ 30. In Connell, the Court remanded a request for attorney
fees to the trial court to make findings whether attorney fees were awarded
under subsection (1) or subsection (2). Id. at ^ 32. The appellate court gave clear
direction to the trial court stating that
"On remand, if the trial court in its discretion orders payment of
reasonable attorney fees pursuant to subsection (1), its order should be
supported by findings relating to Wife's need, Husband's ability to pay,
and the reasonableness of the fees. If the trial court in its discretion orders
payment of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to subsection (2), its order
should be supported by a finding that Wife substantially prevailed on the
motions for which she seeks attorney fees. Finally, if the trial court chooses
to award no fees or limited fees under subsection (2), its order should be
supported by a finding that Husband is impecunious or a statement on the
record of its reason for its decision." Id. at'Tf 32 (emphasis added).
Respondent also objects to the award of attorney fees on the basis that the
court did not consider the financial status and "likely financial results" of the
award of attorney fees. Respondent's argument fails for two (2) reasons. First,
pursuant to Utah Code § 30-3-3(2) the trial court is not required to make findings
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regarding financial status of the parties in awarding attorney fees incurred for
enforcement purposes. The court awarded the attorney fees for enforcement
purposes and, thus, no finding of ability to pay or financial circumstances is
necessary. Second, despite not needing to do so, the trial court made findings
regarding the financial circumstances of the parties when it indicated that he
Respondent had the ability to pay from the equity in the parties' home. As such,
this Court should deny the Respondent's request to overturn the award of
attorney fees to the Petitioner.
VL

PETITIONER SHOULD BE AWARDED HER REASONABLE
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL.
Under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9), "a party seeking to

recover attorney's fees on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth
the legal basis for such an award."
"In domestic cases, when a party has prevailed below and the trial court
has awarded attorney fees, [the appellate court] will generally award the same
party attorney fees when he or she prevails on appeal/' Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT
App. 370,1} 18, 995 P.2d 14. In this matter, Petitioner was awarded attorney fees
and costs by the trial court pursuant to Utah Code § 30-3-3(2). As discussed
previously herein, Utah courts have indicated that "Utah Code Section § 30-3-3
creates two classes of attorney-fees — those incurred in establishing court orders
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and those incurred in enforcing court orders/' See Council v. Council, 2010 UT
App. 139, % 28 (Ut. App. 2010). The trial court awarded the Petitioner attorney
fees and costs incurred in enforcing the trial court's order. Similarly, Petitioner
has been required to reply to the Respondent's brief to enforce the current orders
of this trial court and, accordingly, Petitioner should be awarded attorney fees
and costs on appeal if she prevails.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court's
decisions and award the Petitioner her reasonable attorney fees and cost on
appeal.
Respectfully submitted J u n ^ s ^ O l l .

NATHAN S.SHILL

Counsel for Appellee

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this ^~j day of June 2011/ I caused to be mailed, by
deposit in the United States mail, two (2) true and correct copies and one (1) CD
of the forgoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to:
JOHN WIGHT

1105 N. 2780 W.
PROVO, UTAH 84601

Nathan S. Shill
Counsel for Appelle

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Title/Chapter/Section: j
Utah r / \
Code .

j [Go To]

Search Code bv Key Word

.;;•

Title 30 Husband and Wife
Chapter
. T " ^ P r o p e r t y Rights
Family expenses — Joint and several liability.
y

30-2-9. Family expenses - Joint and several liability.
(1) The expenses of the family and the education of die children are chargeable upon the property
of both husband and wife or of either of them, and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or
separately.
(2) In an action by a creditor against either husband or wife for the payment of a family expense, the
creditor or debtor as the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable collection costs,
interest, and attorney fees as provided in a contract between the cred itor and debtor.
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Utah
Code
Title 30 Husband and Wife
Chapter _ .
~
Divorce
2

Section Advisory guidelines.
33
30-3-33. Advisory guidelines.
In addition to the parent-time schedules provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5, the following
advisory guidelines are suggested to govern all parent-time arrangements between parents.
(1) Parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable to a court-imposed
solution.
(2) The parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity and stability of the child'slife.
v.'" /.'•
(3) Special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child available to attend family
functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and
other significant events in the life of the cliild or in the life of either parent which may inadvertently
conflict with the parent-time schedule.
(4) The responsibility for the pick up, delivery, and return of the child shall be determined by the
court when the parent-time order is entered, and may be changed at any time a subsequent
modification is made to the parent-time order.
(5) If the noncustodial parent will be providing transportation, the custodial parent shall have the
cliild ready for parent-time at the time the child is to be picked up and shall be present at the custodial
home or shall make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the child at the time the child is
returned.
(6) If the custodial parent will be .transporting the child, the noncustodial parent shall be at the
appointed place at the time die noncustodial parent is to receive the child, and have the child ready to
be picked up at the appointed time and place, or have made reasonable altemate arrangements for the
custodial parent to pick up the child.
(7) Regular school hours may not be interrupted for a school-age child for the exercise of parenttime by either parent.
(8) The court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate the
work schedule ofboth parents and may increase the parent-time allowed to the noncustodial parent
but may not diminish the standardized parent-time provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35,5.
(9) The court may make alterationsfathe parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate the
distance between the parties and the expense of exercising parent-time,
(10) Neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld due to either parent's failure to comply
with a court-ordered parent-time schedule.
(11) The custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24 hours of receiving notice of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(12) The noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school reports including preschool and
daycare reports arid medical records and shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent in the
event of a medical emergency.
(13) Each parent shall provide the other with the parent's current address and telephone number,
email address, and other virtual parent-time access information within 24 hours of any change.
(14) Each parent shall permit and encourage, during reasonable hours, reasonable and uncensored
communications with the child, in the form of mail privileges and virtual parent-time
if the equipment is reasonably available, provided that if the parties cannot agree on whether the
equipment is reasonably available, the court shall decide whether the equipment for virtual parent-time
is reasonably available, taking into consideration:
(a) the best interests of the child;
(b) each parent's ability to handle any additional expenses for virtual parent-time; and
(c) any other factors the court considers material.
(15) Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care and the
court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and able to
transport the children, to provide the child care. Child 'care "arrangements existing during the mamiage
v
are preferred as are child care arrangements withnominalor no charge.
(16) Each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the name, current address, and
telephone number of the other parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current
address, and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court for good cause orders
• otherwise.
(17) Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays celebrated by the
parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall
have the right to be together with the child on the religious holiday.
(18) If the child is on a different parent-time schedule than a sibling, based on Sections 30-3-35 and
30-3-35,5, the parents should consider if an upward deviation for parent-time with all the minor
children so that parent-time is uniform between school aged and nonschool aged children, is
• appropriate.
Amended by Chapter 297, 2011 General Session
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Title 30 Husband and Wife
Chapter

Divorce

3

Section

Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Temporary alimony.
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Temporary alimony.
(1) In any actionfiledunder Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate Maintenance, or
Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any action to establish an order of
custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division ofproperty in a domestic case, the com! may
order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, ofthe
other party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include
provisionforcosts of the action.
(2) Iii any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of
property in a domestic case, the court; may award costs and attorney fees upon determining that the
party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees
or limited fees against a party if the courtfindsthe party is inipecunious or enters in the record the
reason for not awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide money, dining the
pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other party and of any children
inthe custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of thefinalolder or judgment may be amended
during the course of the action or in thefinalorder or judgment..
Amended by Chapter 3,2008 General Session
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title 30 Husband and Wife
Chapter _ .
;
Divorce
>

Disposition ofproperty — Maintenance and health care of parties and children — Division of debts —
Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time — Detennination of alimony —
Nonmeritorious petitionformodification.
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties'and children —
Division of debts .—.Court to have continuing jurisdiction-Custody and parent-time Detennination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the
children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in eveiy
decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and
dental expenses of the dependent children including responsibility for health insurance out-of-pocket
expenses such as co-payments, co-insurance, and deductibles;
(b) (i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; and
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which health,
hospital, or dental insurance plan is secondaiy in accordance with the provisions of Section 30-3-5.4
which will take effect if at,any time a dependent child is covered by both parents' health, hospital, or
dental insurance plans;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment ofjoint debts, obligations, or
liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's
division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62 A, Chapter 11, Recovery
Services.
(2) The com! may include, in an order detennining child support, an order assigning financial
responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children,
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court' determines that the
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately caredfor,it may
include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for die dependent children,
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new ordersforthe custody
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father after entry ofthe decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification.
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights ofparents and visitation rights of grandparents and other
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specificfindingby the court of the needfcrpeace officer enforcement, the court may
include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things,
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered
under this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without
merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by
a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been
previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because ofthe other party's failure to
provide or exercise court- ordered visitation or parent-time.
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) thefinancialcondition and needs ofthe recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked hi a business owned or operated by the payor spouse;
and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by
paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school
duringthe marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in detennimng alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of
separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall
consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have
been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed
at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective
standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of
one of the spouses due to die collective efforts of both,' that change shall be considered in dividing the
marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(t) In determining'alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been
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alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances notforeseeableat the time of the
divorce,
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address mzds of the
recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unkss the court feds extenuating
circumstances that justify that action
(iff) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be
considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse'sfinancialability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court'finds that the payor's
improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number ofyears that the marriage
existed unless, at any time prior to tennination of alimony, the ••courtfindsextenuating circumstances that
justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party
pay alimony to a fonner spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that fonner
spouse. However, if the remaixiage is annulled and found to be void abratio,payment of alimony shall
resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are
determined.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse tenninates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that the fonner spouse is cohabitating with another person.
AmendedbyChapter285, 2010 General Session
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Judiciary and Judicial Administration

Chapter

Court of Appeals

Section
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
103
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction;
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and
process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its'judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
. .
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals,
over: V'-V';/:-.
(a) thefinalorders and decrees resulting from fonnal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or
appeals from the district court review of infomial adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the
Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of
Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the
Department ofNatural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appealsfromthe district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies;
and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appealsfromthe juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appealsfromany court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge
of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appealsfroma court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or charge
of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appealsfromorders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated
or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a chaUenge to a conviction of or the
sentence for afirstdegree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the
Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving afirstdegree or capital felony;
(h) appealsfromdistrict court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to,
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and
paternity;
(i) appealsfromthe Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred
tothethe
Court
of Appeals
from
the Clark
Supreme
Court.
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C curt of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction,
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the reqiiii'ements of Title 63G, Cliapter 4,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings,
Amended by Chapter 344, 2009 General Session
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

^ffi/f°

Ron D. Wilkinson (5558)

^

Deputy

The Heritage Building
815 East 800 South
Orem, UT 84097
Telephone: (801) 225-6040
Facsimile: (801) 225-6041

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SPECIAL MASTER ORDER

1 ANNA WIGHT,
Petitioner,
i v.

' ."'•:"

.

Case No. 054401587

•'•

1

Judge: Fred D. Howard
Commissioner: Thomas Patton

JOHN ANDREW WIGHT,
Respondent.

1
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
•1.

Frederick A. Jackman shall be appointed to provide intervention as a Special

Master pursuant to Rule 53, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to resolve disputes involving parent
time issues. This appointment is based upon the stipulation of the parties and the expertise of
Frederick A. Jackman. The Special Master Order pertains to the following children: Jane Wight
(D.O.B. May 23,2002) and William Wight (D.O.B. July 12,2004).
2.

The parties shall comply with the decisions made by Frederick Jackman related to

parent time issues. Pursuant to said appointment and the stipulation of the parties, Frederick
Jackman may:
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Make decisions resolving conflicts between the parents relating to-the

interpretation and application of the Court's parent timt orders which do not
significantly affect the Court's exclusive jurisdiction to determine fundamental
issues of custody and visitation.
B.

If the parties cannot agree on a therapist for treatment regarding the

children's mental health, Mr, Jackman shall make this determination.
3.

- Frederick Jackman's decisions and determinations shall be appealable to the

Court.
4.

Frederick Jackman shall not have authority to make any decisions which

substantially alter the parties' time-sharing arrangements, alter an award of physical custody,
alter an award of legal custody, or substantially interfere with a party's contact with his/her
children. No party contemplates a major re-configuration of the parties' time share arrangement
Tliese decisions and others relating to the best interests of the children are reserved to the Fourth
Judicial District Court and the State of Utah for adjudication..
5.

Decisions of Frederick Jackman, by their very nature, are often made in

circumstances involving severe time constraints, and possible emergencies; therefore, these
decisions may be made orally, but in a fashion communicated directly to both parties. They are
binding when made. In such an event, all such decisions shall be communicated to the parties by
.a confirming letter as well.
6.

The parties shall make reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with Mr. Jackman

as to the terms and conditions of his employment, including compensation for Mr. Jackman's
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services. Petitioner and Respondent shall be equally responsible fo: the cost of the Special
Master. Mr. Jackman may suspend services based upon the failures of either party to maintain
their financial obligations to Mr. Jackman. Notice of suspension of served shall be filed with the
Court.
DATED this M

day ofMaf.:2010.

BY THE COURT

, \£}&.%g0.
• r.fr-v^WWTO^i-.
•„ >»
J u d g e d Howard f
M
, ^ \
\
District Court Judge Bl l-p/:*' :&?& : \
Approved as to form:

vc

NtWM^v.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RULING RE: Objections to the Findings
of Fact and Order

ANNA WIGHT,
Petitioner,

Case No. 054401587
v.
JOHN WIGHT,

•

Judge Fred D. Howard

^

Respondent.

_

.

: L

This matter comes before the Court on an objection to the proposed findings of fact and
order filed by Respondent John Wight. Respondent filed his objection on September 28, 2009
and Petitioner filed her opposition on October 9, 2009. Respondent filed a reply on October 19,
2009 and the matter was submitted for decision on Januaiy 14, 2010. Neither party requested oral
'argument.

.

"

•. .'-••':•,-.;.

Having reviewed the parties' briefs, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause
appearing, the Court now makes the following Ruling:
RULING
The parties were before the Court for a six day bench trial which ended on July 16,2009,
Petitioner submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Order on Hearing. Respondent objects to the

1
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proposed findings. The Court will address the objection to each paragraph separately.
Paragraph 6 "

'•;•;"';''

•••''>;

.'".;•; .'

Respondent objects to paragraph 6 because it includes findings which the Court did not
specifically make from the bench. Petitioner asserts that the paragraph accurately reflects the .
Court's Ruling and that marshaling the evidence is proper.
T h e Court overrules the objection as the finding is consistent with the Court's findings
and Petitioner is not limited to the specific words used in the bench ruling, but can support the •
findings with facts admitted into evidence.
Paragraph?
Respondent objects to paragraph 7 because it fails to clarify that the parties are to use
school to school exchanges except on holidays and it mischaracterizes the Order regarding future
use of ACAFS. Petitioner asserts that the Findings intotalproperly characterizes the type of

.

exchanges that are to occur. Petitioner asserts that.school to school exchanges are to occur except
when the children are not in school, which would include days other than holidays. Additionally,
the terms regarding ACAFS is in accordance with the Ruling and should not be removed.
However, Petitioner does r\o\ object to the inclusion of language which describes how the Court
is optimistic that the parties use of ACAFS will not last long and that only a judge, not a
commissioner, will be able to order the discontinaance of ACAFS.
The Court finds that paragraph 7 is accurate and does not need to be changed in any

o
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substantive way. However, the Court did observe that it was hopeful that ACAFS would not be
necessary for an extended period of time. Therefore, language should be added to the Findings
and Order which reflect this sentiment of the Court..
Paragraph 10
Respondent objects to paragraph 10 because it goes beyond the Court's bench ruling to
include statements the Court did not make. Petitioner asserts that the paragraph is proper as a...
finding of the Court.

•

v,

The Court overrules the objection as the finding is consistent with the Court's findings
and Petitioner is not limited to the specific words used in the bench ruling.
Paragraphs 11-12
Respondent objects to paragraphs 11-12 because they use the teim "Adventure Time" and
not daycare and because the'.term "effectively waived" is used instead of "seemingly waived."
The Petitioner asserts that the Court was addressing Adventure Time and not simply daycare,
which makes the paragraphs proper. Additionally, Petitioner asserts that there is little difference
between "effectively" and "seemingly" and therefore, either term would be proper.
Noting that Petitioner does not object to changing the language, the Court will use the
term "seemingly" rather than "effectively** in the Findings and Order,
x <ii a ^ i apjil !•?

Respondent objects to paragraph 15 because it should simply refer back to the stipulation

3
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of the parties. Petitioner asserts that the language in needed because the Findings later include the
terms of the stipulation which is proper
• The Court finds that the stipulation of the parties does control the parent time issues .
except as supplemented by the Court's Ruling. However, every stipulation needs to be reduced .
from a stipulation to an Order of the Court. Therefore, the Court finds that the inclusion of
paragraph 15 is consistent and -necessary.

•

• -•

4

Paragraphs 16-21
Respondent objects to paragraphs 16-21 because they makefindingsnot included or
contemplated by the Court's bench ruling. Petitioner argues that these paragraphs were
contemplated by the Court and should be included as to limit the confusion regarding the '.-.;.;,
exchanges;

y

'••"''•''-

• •'•';: : \/;-

. ^ ; \ ."••••'..;"

The Court overrules the objection as the finding is consistent with the Court's findings .-,
and Petitioner is not limited to the specific words used inthe bench ruling.
Paragraph 22
Respondent objects to paragraph 22 because it uses "shall receive" instead of "is
awarded." Petitioner does not object to the change of "is awarded" to "shall receive" because
either term is appropriate.
Noting that Petitioner does not object to changing the language, the Court order should
include the term "is awarded*' rather than "shall receive."
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Paragraph 28

'

Respondent objects to paragraph 28 and argues that it should be removed completely

:

because it misstates the Court's findings. Petitioner argues that paragraph 28 reflects the Court's •
Ruling.
The Court overrules the objection as the finding is consistent with the Court's findings
• and Petitioner is not limited to the specific words used in the bench ruling. The Court did find
that the failure to sell the marital home did incur substantial costs for all parties which could have
been reduced or eliminated had Respondent placed the home for sale instead of making a
unilateral decision to move out and rent the marital home.
Paragraph 30
Respondent objects to paragraph 30 and argues that it should be removed completely
because it misstates the Court's findings. Petitioner argues that paragraph 30 does reflect the
Court's Ruling.

:

• ' • •

•r

..:• V.- ;

The Court overrules the objection as the finding is consistent with the Court
and Petitioner is not limited to the specific words used in the bench ruling.
Paragraph 32
Respondent objects to paragraph 32 and argues that it should be removed completely
because it misstates the Court's findings, Petitioner argues that paragraph 32 reflects the Court's
Ruling.
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The Court overrules the objection as the finding is-consistent with the Court's findings
and Petitioner is not limited to the specific words used in the bench ruling.
Paragraphs 34-35
Respondent objects to paragraphs 34-35 and argues that they should be removed
completely because they misstatethe Court'sfindings.Petitioner asserts that these paragraphs are
appropriate because they are the evidence that support the Ruling and were properly marshaled. •
The Court overrules the objection as the finding is consistent with the Court's findings
and Petitioner is not limited to the specific words used in the bench ruling
Paragraphs 37-55
Respondent objects to paragraphs 37-55 and argues that they should be removed
completely because the stipulation of the parties entered on May 6 and May 20, 2009 should be
the final document regarding thosefindings.Petitioner asserts that these paragraphs are important
•for cheating ode document that is the governing Order regarding all issue
Additionally, having one Order will limit confusion and the paragraphs do not substantively
change anything stipulated to by the parties.
The Court finds that the stipulation of the parties does control the parent time issues
except as supplemented by the Court. However, every stipulation needs to be reduced from a
stipulation to an Order ofthe Court. Therefore, the Court finds that the inclusion of paragraphs
37-55 are consistent and necessary. The Court finds that these paragraphs accurately state the

6
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stipulation of the parties and may be entered as part of the Order of the Court.
The Court overrules in part and grants in part Respondent's objections consistent with
this Ruling. Counsel for Petitioner is directed to submit amended Findings and Order on Hearing
consistent with this Ruling.
DATED this ^AjTday of February, 2010.
'.

BYTHECOURT:

m „

...

Hon/Fred D, Howard
District Court Judge
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

t/z'fi*

** Deputy

Ron D. Wilkinson (5558)

2.

The Heritage Building
SI5 East 800 South
Orcm,UT 84097
1 elcphone; ($01) 223-604Q
Facsimile: (801) 225-€04 J '
Attorney for Petitioner

T) roughout this time, the parties have experienced high conflict that h^5

seriously deterred their ability to conmrjnicatc.
3.

The Court does not question that the parties each feci intensely the love

for the children in this matter.
4.

m T H E FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND F O R
UTAI £ COUNTY, STATE O F UTAH

the children.
5.

ANNA WIGHT,

The Court respects both parties desire to preserve ths love ihey have for

THIRD AMENDED FINDINGS AND
ORDER ON HEARING

The Court is required, with tlie remaining issues, lo weigh the equitable

issues to determine what is fair. The Court's ruling is made based on what is fair and

Petitioner/
v.
I
JOHN WIGHT,

•
Respondent.

Case No.: 054401587.
Judge: Howard
Commissioner: Patton

equitable given the circumstances.

;

A C A F S - T H E FAMILY ACADEMY
6.

I

The use of ACAFS for pick-up and drop-off of the children- has bsen

beneficial to the parties. ACAFS has been successfijl in helping tbc parties comrnimicaue
This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Fred D. Howard, for trial. The
Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Ron D. Wilkinson. The Respondent

:

was present and represented by counsel, Steve Christensen and Matt Anderson. The
parties resolved certain issues by stipulation and the Court heard arguments at trial on the

and limiting any potential emotional issues occurring between the parties et pick-up and
drop-off. The emotional issues between the parties are ample and compelling and justify
the need for ACAFS.
7.

remaining issues. Having reviewed the file, hearing evidence and argument from the
parties, and for good cause, the Court finds and orders as follows:
PARENTING ISSUES
I.

There has clearly been a long and difficult history in tills matter.

The parties shall continue to use tlie services of ACAFS for both

calendaring and for pick-up and drop-off. If either party requests ihat ACAFS is no
longer necessary, only a judge may order that ACAFS is no longer nccccsary.

Ike

requesting party must show a change of circumstances has occurred thst no longer
justifies the need for ACAFS. The Court is hopeful that ACAFS will not be necessary for
an extended period of lime.
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RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL
S.

As provided later herein, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the

parties are granted the ri shl of first refusal, under the 1 imits and conditions set forth
herein.

r

16.

<**\

Each party may pick-up or drop-off die duldrcu at school ftu his or her

parent time consistent wiU\ Utah Code § 30-3-35 as described herein.
17.

Consistent witii Utah Code § 30-3-35, when Respondent's parent time

begins on days when the children are attending school or scheduled to attend school, his
5.

Said conditions include Umt, the parties will give the required notice and

opportunity lor first right of refusal, pursuant to the stipulation gf Uto parties, if either
party is leaving the minor children'in the care of a third party for at time period equal to
CT greater than three (3) hours.

The use of Adventure Time's services in this matter was helpful to reduce

.conflict between die parties and was a usual, beneficial, and appropriate form of daycare.
11.

Respondent did not offer a practical alternative to Adventure Time. His

proposed alternatives involved too much shuffling of the children.
12.

Further, Respondent seemingly waived Ids complaint regarding Adventure.

Time by continuing to allow the children to attend Adventure Time.
13.

Petitioner is awarded $5,000.00 for a portion of the costs incurred for

Adventure Tune to provide daycare for the parties minor children.
14.

Adventure Time can continue to be used for the children.
PARENT T I M E

15.

children at school at die time the children arc dismissed.
18.

Consistent wiui Utah Code § 30-3-35, when Respondent's parent tunc

ends on days when the children are attending school or scheduled to attend school, las

CHILD CARE AND CHILD CARE EXPENSES
10.

parent time shad begin at the end of the children's school day and lie shall pick up the

Parent time shall be as later provided herein pursuant to the parties*

parent time shall end at die beginning of the school day and he shall deliver the children
to school at uhc time die children are scheduled to begin their school day.
19.

Consistent with Utah Code § 30-3-35, when Respondent 1 s parent time

begins on days when the children are nut attending school and not scheduled to attend
school, his parent dine, which shall be overnight, shall begin at 6;00 p.m. and he will pick
up the children at ACAFS.
20.

Consistent with Utah Code § 30-3-35, when Respondent's parent time

ends on days when the children arc not attending school and not scheduled to attend
school, his parent time shall end at 9:00 a.m. and he shall drop off the children at
ACAFS.
21.

The parties' parent time for ail holidays shall begin and end consistent

with the relevant time set forth in Utah Code § 30-3-35.

stipulated order.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

f^\

<**\

r

RETROACTIVE CHILD SUPPORT
22.

The Court has considered the parties' claims for retroactively paying '

29.

<-s

Based on the foregoing, the Court will not give the Respondent credit for

the payments that he made on the mortgage of the marital home and Respondent's

and/or adjusting the pa*tics' child support. In weighing all equities, Petitioner is awarded

request for a credit of approximately $13,000.00 reimbursement for payments he made or

S4,632.00 for her claims for retroactive payments of child support. Respondent is

the mortgage is, hereby, denied.

awarded given a credit of $4,084.00 for his claims for retroactive adjustment of his child

30.

Regarding the claims of reduction of the marital assets pursuant to the

support obligation. With the aforementioned offsets, Petitioner is awarded a total amount

carpet allowance and other related expenses, Petitioner shall receive $3,500.00 from

from Respondent of S548.0 for unpaid child support.

Respondent's share of the equity in the marital home.

MARITALHOME
23.

The Court notes in tins matter that the decisions regarding the marital

home require a substantial amount of equitable consideration.
24.

31.

There were miscellaneous expenses for the marital home paid by

Respondent. The parties shall share the miscellaneous costs of $2,362.00, with
Respondent receiving a credit from Petitioner for $1,18 i .00.

Courts generally do not criticize the manner by which people separate.

32.

The Petitioner made payments on the marital home in 2008. The

The Court recognizes that it is usually beneficial to maintain two (2) residences after

payments that the Petitioner made for the mortgage in 2008 shall be shared equally, with

separation to avoid conflict, potential domestic violence, and other concerns.

Petitioner receiving a credit of $1,947.24.

25.

In the current case. Respondent made an ill-advised decision when he left

ATTORNEY FEES

the home and decided to rent the marital home to third parties, as well as obtain another
residence for himself.

26.

33.

The Court has carefully considered the request for attorney fees of the

parties in his matter,

Normally the expenses of the parties double after separation. In this case,

tlie Respondent made a decision to nearly triple the expenses of the parties.

34.

Respondent's actions and failures clearly resulted in Petitioner incurring

substantial attorney fees. Respondent's actions and failures include the following:

27.

Respondent could have reduced expenses by staying in the marital home.

A.

Repeatedly failing to timely pay his child support obligation.

28.

Respondent could also reduced expenses by immediately placing the

B.

Repeatedly failing to timely pay his one-half (1/2) of the insuiaace

marital home for sale.

premiums for the minor children.
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C.

Repeatedly failing to timely pay his one-half (1/2) of the

relationships between the children and each parent. In choosing school and other

D.

locations where the children will participate in activities, the above-stated purpose shall

Repeatedly failing tc imeiy pay the mortgage payments he was

ordered to maintain.

35.

the parties because proximity allows both parents to maintain and foster strong

uncovered medical expenses for the minor children.

guide both parents' decisions.

E.

Failing to timely pay for the custody evaluation ices.

F.

Interfering witluhc children's daycai-c at Adventure Time.

Petitioner was required to bring multiple Orders to Show Cause because of

39.

the Children, SUhjCCt tO Respondent spending time with the children according to the
following parent-time schedule:

said failures.
3G.

Parent Time Schedule; Petiuoncr v/ill provide the primary residence for

A.
Petitioner is, therefore, awarded $4,000.00 in attorney fees in this .matter.

When school is in session, Respondent shall have parent-time with

die children every other weekend beginning on Friday after school and

The Com! finds that the above-mentioned fees were actually incurred, the fees arc

ending on the following Monday. The parties were unable to resolve the

reasonable and necessary, and the Respondent lias the ability to pay the attorney fees with

issue of when Respondent's parent time ends on Monday. This issue was

the offsets zi\& home equity he is receiving in this matter.

resolved by decision of the Court previously stated herein.

ORDER AND FINDINGS BASED ON STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES AND
FURTHER ORDER AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT
37.

Custody: The parties shall have joint legal and joint physical custody of

their minor children, Jane Wight and William Wight, as further described herein. For the
purposes of parent-time, Petitioner is, hereby, designated as the "custodial parent" and
Respondent is designated as the "noncustodial parent."
33.

Purpose and Intent of the Parties: The parties seek to maximize the tim&

each parent has with the children and to facilitate meaningful parent-time for both
parents. To that end, living in close proximity to each other was stated to be important to

B.

When school is in session, during the week(s) Respondent has

weekend parent time with the children, Respondent shall have mid-week
parent-lime with the children beginning on Tuesday after school and
ending on Wednesday. The parties were unable to resolve the issue of
when Respondent's parent time ends on Wednesday. The issue was
resolved by decision of the Court previously stated herein.
C.

When school is in session, during the week that the Respondent

does not have weekend parent-time, Respondent shall have parent-time
with the children on Thursday beginning after school and ending on
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Friday. The parties were unable to resolve the issue of when

C.

Respondent's parent lime ends on Friday. The issue was resolved by

has elected for his parent-time over scheduled holiday weekends to begin

decision of the Court previously stated herein.

from the time the children's school is regularly dismissed at the beginning

D.

William shall attend half day kindergarten.

of the holiday weekend until 7:00 p.m. on the last day of the holiday

E.

All parent time not awarded to the Respondent shall be awarded tr>

weekend.

the Petitioner consistent with Utah Code § 30-3-35 and the schedule set

40.

r*

41.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35(2)(e)(b) r Respondent

Right of First Refusal: Both parties, before leaving the children ••vii.h a

forth herein.

third party, shall give the other parent the first opportunity to provide care fur liu; child.

F.

The parent requesting care shall email the other as soon as he/she is reasonable able after

The parties shall have extended parent time with the children

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35.

learning of the need for care for the children. If the notice of the need for care is less man

Holiday Parent Time: Except as otherwise provided herein, the parties

24 hours from the time care is needed, notice will be given by a telephone call to the

shall have holiday parent-time with the children pursuant to Utah Cpde Annotated § 30-

other parent's cellular telephone. The parent providing care shall pick up and return the

3-55.

children promptly.
A.

Petitioner shall always have holiday parent time on President's
th

42.

Daycare:

Day, July 4 , Memorial Day, and Spring Break. Petitioner will have

A.

Mother's Day from 7:00 p.m. on the Saturday before the holiday until 7:00

during both parlies' routine work day, Petitioner will choose the day care,

p.m. on the holiday.

subject to the Respondent's right of first refusal.

B.

B.

Respondent shall always have parent time on Human Right's Day,

If the need for surrogate care is ongoing and regular, such as

If a parent is not available to care for the children when sporadic

July 24*\ Labor Day, and Fall Break. Respondent will have Father's Day

daycare is required, the parent who has the children in his/her can; at the

from 7:00 p.m. on the Saturday before the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the

time will choose a daycare provider for the child.

holiday.
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Friday. The panics were unable to resolve the issue of when

C.

Respondent's parent time ends on Friday. The issue was resolved by

has elected for his parent-time over scheduled holiday weekends to begin

decision of the Court previously stated herein.

from the time the children's school is regularly dismissed at the beginning

D.

William shall attend half day kindergarten.

of die holiday weekend until 7:00 p.m. on the last day of the holiday

E." .

All parent time not awarded to the Respondent shall be awarded to-

weekend.

the Petitioner consistent widi Utah Code § 30-3-35 and the schedule set

40.

41.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated ij 30-3-35(2)(cX"). K-spunwrn

Right of Pirst Refusal: Both parties, before leaving the childrrn with ?,

forth herein.

third party, shall give the other parent the first opportunity to provide care fu; ihs child.

F.

The parent requesting care shall email the other as soon as he/she is reasonable nblc after

The parties shall have extended parent lime with the children

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35.

learning of the need for care for the children. If the notice of the need for care is less than

Holiday Parent Time: Except as otherwise provided herein, the parties

24 hours from the time care is needed, notice will be given by a telephone call lo the

shall have holiday parent-time with the children pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-

other parent's cellular telephone. The parent providing care shall pick up and return the

3-35.

children promptly.
A.

Petitioner shall always have holiday parent time on President's

42.

Daycare:

Day, July 4 th , Memorial Day, and Spring Break. Petitioner will have

A.

Mother's Day from 7:00 p.m. on the Saturday before the holiday until 7:00

during both parties' routine work day, Petitioner will choose the d:iy care,

p.m. on the holiday.

subject to die Respondent's right of first refusal.

B.

B.

Respondent shall always have parent time on Human Right's Day,
th

If the need for surrogate care is ongoing and regular, sue h as

If a parent is not available to care for the children when sporadic

July 24 , Labor Day, and Fall Break. Respondent will have Father's Day

daycare is required, the parent who has the children in his/her care at the

from 7:00 p.m. on the Saturday before the holiday until 7:00 p j n . on the

time will choose a daycare provider for the child.

v

holiday.
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children's day-to-day activities and care while the children are with that

regarding bed lime, homework, lessons, school projects, ano $»«»*.•! .J

parent

conduct.

K.

Doth parties can make emergency decisions regarding the children

N.

The parties shall consult with each other if cither of them becomes

when the children are in his/her care and shall timely notify the other

aware that the children are experiencing difficulties in school, emotional

parent of said emergency.

problems, or any otficr issues that they each would wish to be infocm-cd of

I..

regarding their minor children.

Before making any non-routine decisions affecting the children

(generally a decision which significantly affects the care or wellbeing of

O.

the child outside of that parent's time or requires significant effort by the

conversations with the children, and enccurage the children's continuing

other parent, it is considered a non-routine decision), which may include

love and affection for both parents. In no event shall either parly demean

education, health care, extracurricular activities or religious activities

or disparage the other parent in the children's presence, o r p r r r u t the

regarding the minor children, Ihcy shall first consult each other by text or

children to remain in the presence of any third party who does so.

email regarding the decision, which means mat they shall each exchange

P.

The parties shall hold the other in higli esteem in their

Children's extracurricular activities:

at least one text or email about the issue before making a decision. After

1.

discussing the matter, Petitioner shall have final say in making all

shall work together to accommodate the child's participation hi the

decisions regarding the children, except if the patties cannot agree on a

activity by coordinating transportation during his/her time and

therapist for treatment regarding the children's mental health, the therapist

sharing the cost of the activity. The parties shall reasonably

for the children shall be determined by a Special Master, Frederick A.

support music lessons and church activities.

Jackman.

2.

M.

can still have the child participate in the activity nt his/her cost

The parties shall support each other as parents in establishing and

enforcing consistent rules and discipline in their respective households
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If the parties both agree to support the nctiv; ty, ibe ; o l ies

If the parties do not agree to support the activity., one parent

during his/her parent time.

r*

Q.

^

^

Both parties shall be entitled to reasonable telephone contact with

to reasonably participate with William in scouting activities that William

the children on days they do not see the children, which shall be

participates in.

unmonitored.

U.

R.

the children's homework, uniforms, clothes, and other objects that the

Both parties shall keep each other informed of his or her address

The parties shall reasonably work together to coordinate sharing,

and telephone number at all times.

children need in both homes, Clothes which go with a child to the other

S.'.

parent's hOUSC shall timely come back with the children.

Bach party shall notify the other whenever he or she intends to take

the children on ati overnight trip exceeding one night and provide the other

45. . Communication: The parties shall communicate in writing, by email or

•with a travel itinerary with addresses and telephone numbers when

text messaging unless communication is time sensitive—then telephone 'communication

reasonably available where he or she may be Tcachcd in the event of an

can be used. The parties will treat each other respectfully and limit their discussions 10

emergency.

issues related to the children.

T.

Both parents shall facilitate opportunities Tor the other parent to

46.

Tax Exemptions: Jorm shall claim Jane and .Aniia shall claim William as

participate in enriching activities with the children. Respondent is hereby

tax exemptions. When Jane reaches majority, the parties shall claim William hi

given the option (when he is willing and able) to perform all church

alternating years. Both parents shall cooperate in signing the appropriate IRS forms to

ordinances, which must be done by a man, for the children. Petitioner

effectuate this paragraph.

shall be allowed to take the children on modier-daughtcr and mother-son

47.

Costs: Statutory provisions shall apply as it relates to daycare (Utah Code

activities when there is not an important conflicting event with

§ 78B-12-214), insurance premiums (Utah Code § 78B-J.2-212), and uncovered medical,

Respondent. Likewise, Respondent shall also be allowed to lake the

dental, and mental health expenses (Utah Code § 78B-12-212), Said codes are attached

children to father-son and fauSer-daughter activities, and to take "William

hereto and incorporated by this reference.

to general priesthood meeting twice each year when there is not an
important conflicting event with Petitioner. Respondent shall be allowed

48.

School'. If either party determines to move from Provo School District, he

or she shall first provide 30 days notice to the other parent.
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r.

''W-

<**>

ACAFS: The parties shall use ACAF S to create a calendar for their parent

52.

^

Contempt: There shall be no citation of contempt against Respondent,

time, for which each party will pay one-half of the cost If there is a need to chance the

except as it relates to an award of attorney fees. All requests for contempt sanctions other

calendar, they should communicate at least once via e-mail with each'other before

than as it relates to an award of attorney fees shall be dismissed.

requesting ACAFS to act as a mediator. No provision in this paragraph gives ACAFS
decision-making authority.
50.

53.

Kfarital Home: On or about October 27. 2008. the parties sold the marital

home, which was acquired by the parties during their marriage, located at 874 East 1150

Communications Regarding Other Parent: The parties shall be mutually

North, Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062. The proceeds of this sale in the amount of

restrained from making derogatory remarks regarding the other party to, or in the •

approximately $42,312.26 were thereafter transferred to an account with Weils Fargo

presence of, the minor children. The parties shall use their best efforts to prevent third

Dank, Account No. 339-3907724. These proceeds should be divided between the parties

praties from speaking in a disparaging manner about either parent in the presence of the

as follows:

cJJUJ. The parties shall also be mutually restrained from making derogatory remarks

A.

about the other party to his or her fellow employees, employers and/or ecclesiastical

party will have $21,156.13.

leaders.

B.
51.

Child Support: Child Support in this matter shall be pursuant to statute

The proceeds shall be divided by the parties equally, such thiu each

From Respondent's half of the proceeds shall be deducted the

amount of $5,234.07 for child support related issues. This amount shall be

and shall be baaed upon the parties' incomes and the parties* stipulation regarding

added to Petitioner's share of Ac proceeds.

custody and parent time. Respondent's income for the purpose of calculating child

C.

support shall be $2,382.00 per month. Petitioner's income for the purposes of calculating

amount of $6,000.00 for her share of the marital debt. This amount shall

child, support shall be $5,333.00 per month. Respondent's child support obligation shall

be added to the Respondent's share of the proceeds, thereby, resolving ail

bs $126.00 beginning May 1, 2009. In one year, the Court, based upon future change of

issues of marital debt, except as otherwise set forth herein.

income, may review child support and make modifications even if mere is less than a

D.

15°. o change of income.

shall have $20,390.20 of the proceeds, S5,234.07 of which has already
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From Petitioner's share of the ptoceeds shell be deducted the

Therefore, pursuant to the calculations set forth above. Petitioner

y%\

been disbursed to her, and Respondent shall have 521,922.06 of the
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE

proceeds:
E.

The amount of $5,234.07 has already been disbursed to Petitioner

: .•

Pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, you are, hereby, notified

from the sale proceeds for child support related issues and this amount

that the foregoing Order will be sent to the court for signing upon the expiration of five

shall accordingly be deducted from her $20,390.20 share of the proceeds.

(5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless a written

F.

objection is filed with the Court prior to that time.

The amount of $3,894.47 has also been disbursed to Petitioner

DATED titis ^ T d a y of September 2010.

from the sale proceeds to reimburse her for mortgage payments that she
made on the marital home.
54.

>rW!fkinson, Attorney for Petitioner

Parlies' Homes; The parties shall not enter either of the other parties*

homes without written invitation. In addition, the parties shall not go to the other's home
without 24 hours written notice unless it is to pick up and drop off the children pursuant
MAILING CERTIFICATE

to written Dgreement or court order.
•55.

Personal Property. Each party is hereby awarded the personal property in

his or her possession.
56.

Special Master. Frederick A. Jactonan is appointed as a Special Master in

this matter and a Special Master Order shall issue.
DATED this £f

I hereby certify that I mailed, this 3
foregoing document to the following:
John Wight
1105 North 2780 West
Provo, Utah 84601

of FcbRtary 2010.
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day of September 2010, a copy of the

